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Abstract 
 
 During the British Empire’s colonial occupation of Kenya, which began in 1895, a new 
sense of Kenyan nationalism emerged.  Between 1952 and 1956, the combined Kenyan tribes—
united for the first time and calling themselves the Mau Mau—launched a violent guerilla war 
against the occupying British forces.  Militarily, the Kenyans were no match for the seasoned 
soldiers, yet the rebellion became a significant cause of the ultimate British decision to withdraw 
from the Kenyan colony.  Policy makers in the British metropole—the political and cultural 
center of the British Empire—grew concerned that any reprisal against further Mau Mau 
insurgent action would lead to socio-political repercussion that the dwindling empire could ill 
afford.  By 1954, in response to their own political fears, the colonial government, in full 
cooperation with the Home Office, increased the repression of the native Kenyans in an attempt 
to cover up the abuses the Kenyans suffered under British rule.  It was not until 2005 that 
investigative historians uncovered evidence of these abuses, and by 2011 thousands of 
documents offered incriminating evidence of both colonial abuse and the complicity of the 
central government.  This paper examines how fears of socio-political repercussions over 
colonial abuses in Kenya led directly to the decision to decolonize.  At the core of this anxiety 
lay the Mau Mau rebellion and the British governments attempts to obfuscate the true nature of 
the insurrection. 
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Introduction 
British forces faced little resistance in their initial efforts to colonize the nation of Kenya 
in 1895.  European governments had been carving up the continent of Africa for decades and had 
become adept at managing native populations.  The colonial governors in Kenya kept relative 
peace through the mid-twentieth century.  In response to growing dissatisfaction with imperial 
rule, Kenyans, led by the large Kikuyu tribe, staged a violent revolt against the British colonists 
in 1952. 1  The insurgency was known as the Mau Mau rebellion, so named after the title given 
to the Kenyan freedom fighters by British soldiers.  British de-colonization occurred twelve 
years later in 1964, after more than a decade of guerilla warfare.  During this time, the once 
tribally oriented natives gained a sense of national identity.  This nationalistic identity, born 
under imperial subjugation, was synonymous with the insurrectionist Mau Mau warriors in the 
minds of the British government.  Their nationalist ideas represented a substantial threat to the 
stability of the Kenyan colony.  The rebellion also renewed interest in Kenya in the metropole 
and abroad as allegations of mistreatment caused embarrassment to both colonial officials and 
those in the British Home Office.  The insurrection did not defeat Britain militarily, yet the fear 
of potential repercussions that further violence might precipitate did influence policy in Britain. 2  
Kenyan independence is a direct result of British anxiety that socio/geopolitical repercussions—
including the loss of Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States in a modern era of 
                                                 
1 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya 
(New York: Henry and Holt, 2005), 338. 
 
2 Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod claimed suffrage as a necessity as far back as 1960 but 
with little result other than exciting the Kenyan peoples and putting on a show for political 
motivations. 
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multiculturalism, and U.S. anxieties that communistic ideology would infiltrate a weak Africa—
would prove substantial, if not disastrous, should hostilities with the Mau Mau resume. 
Kenya maintains an important position in the discussion of African decolonization. It 
was, along with Uganda, the earliest African colony to win its freedom from the British Empire 
by way of military and nationalistic uprisings.3  The cascade of decolonization that followed was 
controlled by a British Parliament that recognized the difficulties of maintaining colonial 
possessions in the face of metropolitan, international, and colonial pressures.   By 1980, the 
British Empire had relinquished all colonial holdings in Africa.  The Mau Mau and other colonial 
freedom fighters created an environment that destabilized British relations at home and abroad 
leading to the eventual dissolution of a nearly four-hundred-year old empire. 
 The British initially entered Kenya in 
1895 to create a rail system from the Port of 
Mombasa directly to Lake Victoria, cementing 
their power and access to raw materials in the 
region.  During the expedition, Britons 
recognized a favorable climate and rich 
agricultural soil.  The early colonists quickly 
ousted the native population from the best 
lands in the “White Highlands.”  The Kikuyu 
tribe, the largest in Kenya, was taxed by the 
British government in order to provide early 
                                                 
3 Parsons, The Second British Empire, 172 
Figure 1Map of Kenya: circa 1920, WWW.Worldhistory.Biz 
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settlers a means of obtaining labor.4  The Kenyans had to work for the British in order to pay the 
new taxes.  Control of the populace through the combination of force and manipulative measures 
followed only after the Kenyan colony had been reworked into a British-style bureaucratic 
system, placing the Kenyans, from the British perspective, under legal colonial authority.5 
 From the moment the British appropriated power from the native population in 1920, the 
history of Kenya was written by government documents. Examination of these documents, later 
used to condemn the colonial system, shows acceptance of physical violence as useful in 
controlling the native populace as well as knowledge of colonial abuses in the highest level of 
government.6 However, prior to the additional news coverage provided by the Mau Mau 
rebellion, British societies understanding of Kenya and Kenyans was shaped by pulp and 
propaganda.   Popular culture reacted to tales of savage natives terrorizing British colonists, thus 
allowing for popular magazines to titillate and alarm their thousands of subscribers with 
fabricated stories and articles about anachronistic native persons.7  Although these articles were 
made for entertainment, the argument must be made that the social consciousness must have 
accepted them on some level, as no outcry in favor of the Kenyans had been recorded at this 
time.  More serious articles were printed that displayed a decidedly racist and Anglo-centric 
                                                 
4 Cynthia Brantley, The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1981), 91. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Documents Relating to the Deaths of Eleven Mau Mau 
Detainees at Hola Camp in Kenya (London: H.M.S.O., 1959). 
 
7 Clyde Wolfe, “I Was a Victim of the Mau Mau Ant Torturers,” Man’s Action 1, no. 11 
(1960): 36-37, 46. 
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perspective that Kenyans were “incapable of self-rule” and should be grateful for the 
intervention of the British who had “it in their nature to rule over others.”8 
Kenyans eventually rebelled against their serf-like status which led to severe restrictions 
and brutal treatment of any captive “insurgents.”9  The mounting public and international 
pressures, which Prime Minister Harold McMillan (1957-63) had been able to control before the 
rebellion, led to the belief that Kenya was no longer a viable colonial acquisition.  McMillan—
under pressure from the United States, reeling from the Suez debacle and preparing to run for re-
election—sought to end the debate by agreeing to decolonize Kenya.10  Although a momentous 
political movement, decolonization did little to create a revisionist history of colonial Africa for 
several decades. 
Historiography 
The traditional British history of Kenya, controlled by the colonial government, is replete 
with propaganda and misinformation. The efforts of modern historians have exposed these 
misconceptions to acknowledge the native population as freedom fighters, protecting their lands 
from oppressive foreign occupiers. Through the investigative work of scholars such as Caroline 
Elkins, the history of British Kenya has undergone remarkable revision. Elkins leads this 
                                                 
8 Olga Watkins, “The Indian Question in Kenya,” Fortnightly Review 114 (1923): 95-
103. 
9 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of 
Empire (New York: W.W. Norton), 146. 
10 Ibid., 328. 
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revisionist historiography with her pursuit of secret British government documents, interviews 
with native Kenyans, and her defense of her groundbreaking Imperial Reckoning. 
The history of colonial Kenya was difficult to navigate before Elkins’ discoveries and 
revisionist work. Earlier historians of the Kenyan people were stymied by a lack of 
documentation.  Further, disparate languages, customs and cultures made a unified history of the 
population impossible as perspectives on the Kenyan culture were irredeemably dissimilar even 
within the native population.11  Education in Kenya: A Historical Study by James R. Sheffield 
displays another common theme: a (possibly) unconscious perspective of a benign colonial 
government’s attempts to educate and civilize the tribal natives. These early attempts at 
understanding the societal nature of the Kenyans were also generally from a pre-postcolonial 
academic perspective.  They sought to understand rebellion and colonial rule but without an anti-
imperial bias that may have been unpopular at home.  It should also be noted that Nairobi, the 
capitol of Kenya, where many early historians conducted their research, was well-developed and 
comfortable by European standards.  This city of European privilege would have housed 
wealthy, colonial landowners who extolled the virtues of Kenyan colonialism, doing much to 
allay any scandal that close research may bring to bear.   
In 1998, Caroline Elkins discovered a folder marked “secret” in the British archives that 
detailed Hola camp superintendent Terence Gavaghan’s “dilution technique” of torture.12  Hola 
camp was created by the colonial governor to house Mau Mau detainees and was run by 
commandant Gavaghan.  To further substantiate the evidence that she discovered, Elkins went to 
                                                 
11 Brantley, The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya, 91. 
 
12 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 320. 
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Kenya and conducted extensive interviews.  She presented her findings in her 2005 book 
Imperial Reckoning in which she detailed the detention of 1.5 million Kenyans and the 
systematic torture of prisoners by colonial powers.  Elkins’ discovery spurred on a new 
movement in the legacy of Kenya’s history.  Other authors, notably David Anderson, published 
similar, though less radical, revisionist works the same year. 
 Elkins came under immediate and intense scrutiny by critical academics such as Bethwell 
Ogot, a senior Kenyan historian, who published a searing rebuttal of her claims in the Journal of 
African History.13  As Elkins’ book is primarily supported by personal anecdotes made by the 
survivors she interviewed, he accused her of sensationalism and outright fabrication. He argued 
her numbers as well as her facts to be significantly overestimated.  Elkins’ extensive reference 
section is significantly shorter when personal interviews are removed.  Many of the interviews 
are titled “anonymous” making her case that much harder to substantiate. However, the 
corroborating, although less antagonistic, works by Anderson and Kenyan native Mugo Gatheru 
were enough to spur surviving victims of Hola to sue the British government for recognition of 
colonial abuses and restitution for their suffering.14  Gatheru was raised in colonial Kenya and 
offered a first-hand account of colonial atrocities from a native perspective.  He would later 
receive his education in law in England, making him an educated Kenyan voice that was hard for 
British political leaders to ignore. For his part, Anderson provided examples of how the British 
government used propaganda to quell social unrest in Kenya. He asserts powers in colonial 
                                                 
13 Marc Perry, “Uncovering the Brutal Truth About the British Empire,” The 
Guardian.com (2016). 
 
14 R. Mugo Gatheru, Kenya: From Colonization to Independence, 1888-1970 (Jefferson, 
N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2005), 
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Kenya and the British metropole, including the Prime Minister, were complicit in the cover up of 
abuse in the colony.15 
During the investigation leading up to the 2011 lawsuit, documents previously believed 
destroyed were re-discovered.  They not only revealed systematic abuse and torture, but implied 
the complicity of the British government.16 Elkins, Anderson, and Gatheru were vindicated in 
their revisionist theories of the colonial abuses in Kenya, especially in regards to the Mau Mau 
and Hola detention center.  The histories, for the moment, were disseminated by the press as a 
matter of global interest in the litigation against the British Government.   
 The release of many of the documents—300 boxes have been released but 13 are still 
“missing”—spurred other academic authors to renew the investigation into colonial Kenya as 
well as its inclusion into discussions of imperial injustice.  Gillian Fazan sought to understand 
the plight of Kenyans’ public health and how global conflict affected social and political change 
in Kenya in Colonial Kenya Observed.17  Micki Hudson-Koster published an amazing treatise on 
the Mau Mau titled The Making of Mau Mau: The Power of the Oath; it provides a fascinating 
insight into the Kenyan freedom fighters: who they were, what they believed and how they lived 
during the occupation.18  The Mau Mau had turned a historical corner as they were no longer 
                                                 
15 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 327. 
 
16 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Further Documents Relating to the Deaths of Eleven 
Mau Mau Detainees at Hola Camp in Kenya (London: H.M.S.O., 1959). 
 
17 S. H. Fazan, Colonial Kenya Observed: British Rule, Mau Mau and the Wind of 
Change, ed. John Lonsdale (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 2015), 
 
18 Mickie Hudson-Koster and Edward Cox. The Making of Mau Mau: The Power of the 
Oath, 2010. 
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seen simply as victims of imperial might, but were recognized as a unique culture who added 
depth and value to the global story of which they were a part. 
 Currently, the Mau Mau are in the public sphere once more as more victims seek 
restitution from the British government in an ongoing lawsuit.  The current lawsuit seeks 
compensation for emotional trauma experienced during the occupation.19  The history of the Mau 
Mau is not yet complete: the disclosure of the missing file boxes, the satisfactory resolution of 
the court process and having their history, both pre and post-colonial, fully documented will do 
much to conclude the revisionist histories published by historians from 2005 onward. 
 Although treated individually by revisionist historians, the causation of decolonization 
due to (A.) fear of a Mau Mau resurgence causing political sanctions, combined with (B.) United 
States’ interference, based on anti-communist ideology, to create an intense anxiety in the British 
metropole. This dual causation has not been sufficiently examined and is the subject of this 
paper. 
 
A History of Kenya 
Pre-colonial Kenya was populated by diverse tribes that competed for grazing and 
agricultural territory and water; tribes were too small to create a centralized governmental system 
but were patriarchal in nature.  Several tribes would often merge to create a clan which 
facilitated the growth and safety of individual nuclear families while ensuring genetic health.  
While some Kenyan natives were herders and farmers, fishing and hunter-gatherer tribes were 
                                                 
19 Perry, “Uncovering the Brutal Truth About the British Empire.” 
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predominant.  Although some Arab settlers and European explorers had made contact with 
various Kenyan tribes, there seems to have been little cultural exchange before the nineteenth 
century.20   
 In 1895, British extended rule to include Kenya as the East Africa Protectorate.  The 
original plan was simply to facilitate construction of a rail line from the port of Mombasa 
directly to Lake Victoria, creating a strategic link with British-held Uganda.  During the 
construction of the rail line, British officials discovered a climate they found agreeable and 
recognized the agricultural promise of the region—the fertile, nutrient-rich soil being especially 
suitable for the production of tea and coffee. 21   The earliest colonists quickly secured the most 
profitable lands in the Rift Valley and Highlands for white usage only. 22   Trade from coffee was 
an immediate financial success, made possible by the labor of the reluctant native population. 23    
Railroad construction may have caused the initial bitterness between the British and Kenyans, 
but it was the unfair land use restrictions which resulted in violent protests by the native tribes. 
British colonial police responded to the violence with swift, military brutality; rather than cowing 
the Kenyans, this action unified the tribes in an anti-imperialistic attitude.24   
 At the conclusion of the First World War, Kenya received a massive influx of white 
settlers which resulted in a deepening sense of national identity among tribes which united 
                                                 
20 Norman Miller and Rodger Yeager. Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1994. 7-8; Gatheru, Kenya, 31. 
 
21 Fazan, Colonial Kenya Observed, 49. 
22 Ibid., 150. 
 
23 Ibid., 155. 
 
24 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 2. 
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against a common threat. 25 Coupled with this new-found sense of unity came a willingness 
among Kenyans to use violence to reclaim their land.   By 1920, more than 25,000 British 
colonists, mostly farmers, had relocated to Kenya. 26  In order to make space for the incoming 
colonists, British forces removed more than one million Kenyans from their homes and stripped 
them of their lands. The British government continued to take native Kenyan land during the 
Second World War to house a military base while Kenyans provided nearly 100,000 native 
troops to the British war effort.  These returning troops, having experienced life outside of 
Africa, came home with firmly entrenched concepts of nationalism, self-rule and modernization.  
In 1947, reacting to increasing pressures and abuses of white Europeans, Kenyans elected Jomo 
Kenyatta to lead the Kenyan African Union (KAU). The KAU represented the united, 
nationalistic front of Kenyans tribes who demanded representation in government as well as the 
return of their lands. 27   
 These new nationalistic perspectives facilitated the unification and cooperation of several 
tribes.  The result was an ideologically motivated, militaristic band of freedom fighters whose 
sole intention was to overthrow the small minority of white settlers. 28 The colonial police 
stationed in Kenya, recognizing the disproportionate numbers, the unfamiliar and unforgiving 
terrain, as well as following a political agenda that did not allow for negotiation, desperately 
pleaded for military intervention.  British policy makers were slow to respond to such requests, 
                                                 
25 Gatheru, Kenya, 138. 
26 Fazan, Colonial Kenya Observed, 75. 
 
27 Gatheru, Kenya, 131. 
 
28 Fazan, Colonial Kenya Observed, 193. 
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believing the Kenyans to be inferior “savages” incapable of becoming a serious military threat.  
Further, British Parliament did not recognize the legitimacy of the Kenyan political party the 
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA)—predecessor to the Kenyan African Union (KAU)—thereby 
portraying these “Mau Mau” as terrorists rather than political insurgents. 29 Creating the fiction 
of rebellious savages with no political motivations reassured policy makers and the public alike 
that the insurrection would quickly be quelled and that Britain was acting within moral 
boundaries. 
 While there is no agreement on the etymological origins of the moniker Mau Mau, there 
is one theory that seems the most plausible.  A Kikuyu prisoner was being interrogated by the 
colonial magistrate in 1950 and his response was “Maundo maumau nderiruo ndikoige,” which 
translates as “Those things I was told not to reveal.”30  The term Mau Mau became the name 
used by the British, historians and the Kenyan rebels themselves. 
 The Mau Mau should not be seen as a political, religious or cultural movement. Rather, 
the rebels who came from the forty tribes of Kenya to enlist in the Mau Mau movement 
symbolized a nationalistic sensibility learned from shared experiences with the colonists.  
Perhaps one reason the Mau Mau were continuously underestimated in the metropole was the 
Kenyan ability to adhere to tribal loyalties concurrently with those of the rebellion.  This divided 
aspect, as seen from the outside, would confuse colonial officials as to the true number of 
insurgents as well as the depth of their loyalty.  Further adding to this sense of British over-
confidence was the idea that the Mau Mau were a rag tag band of jungle warriors whereas, in 
                                                 
29 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 49. 
 
30 Gatheru, Kenya, 148. 
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truth, they followed commands from central leadership in Nairobi that coordinated military 
action.31  As confidence and respect grew among the tribes of Kenya, more and more flocked to 
the Mau Mau cause.  In order to create a sense of unity, ancient tribal traditions of oathing 
ceremonies were practiced. 
 The Oath itself was a secret, sacred right that was morally and spiritually binding.  There 
are no records of the oath but several of its aspects have been pieced together.  They are thought 
to include “If I know of any enemy of our organization and fail to kill him, may this oath kill 
me,” and “If I reveal this oath to any European, may this oath kill me.”32  This last pledge might 
explain why we know so little of the details surrounding the vows themselves.  The ceremony 
would include the slaughter of a goat and a ceremonial bite from its flesh.33  Reports of these 
practices were perverted by some English who sought to demonize the Kenyans to the British 
people.  Candour, a conservative publication in England, reported the ceremony as comprising of 
bestial and cannibalistic acts with vows that included cannibalizing their enemies and sharing 
their wives with their fellow Mau Mau.34  No historical record supports such obviously 
inflammatory speech, yet examining other publications of the time show anti-Kenyan sentiment 
remained strong until after the events of Hola camp became public knowledge.  Hola camp 
gained its notoriety as only those Mau Mau who would not renounce their oath were sent there.  
                                                 
31 Gatheru, Kenya, 143. 
 
32 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 26. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 A.K. Chesterson, “Mau Mau Oaths and Ceremonies,” Candour Supplement (1960). 
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Mainstream media outlets, such as The Daily Mirror, ran articles refuting the 
governments’ propaganda with articles reporting on the brutality of colonial subjugation while 
legitimizing colonial efforts by referring to the Kenyans as “beastly” and “savage.” 35  
Eventually, European clergy joined with Labour Party representatives and the African press to 
publicly denounce British colonial crimes. By 1952, however, public opinion had been 
fundamentally influenced by ceaseless government propaganda efforts which delivered 
increasingly horrific disinformation concerning the nature of the Kenyan people. 36 
 Britain’s decision to label the rebels as terrorists by not recognizing the KAU as a 
legitimate political entity enabled colonists to treat all Africans as insurgents and, as such, a 
threat to their personal safety and British property.  These colonial farmers, many of whom had 
military backgrounds, had been battling the Kenyans for years; they understood the terrain and 
knew the region as well as the natives they ousted.  The British government capitalized on the 
idea the colonists were “kith and kin”, turning public sympathy if favor of the colonists while 
further entrenching the idea of Kenyan savagery in the public mind. 37    The government also 
argued that the Kenyan people could not be “considered civilized nor a possess a legitimate 
political center” if local “farmers” were able to subdue the insurgents. 38    In the face of this 
                                                 
35 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 307-308.; See bibliography for depiction in a popular 
men’s magazine of the era for a pulp and yet accepted idea of the average Britons concept of a 
Mau Mau warrior.  Propaganda went so far as to insinuate cannibalism. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 4. 
 
38 Farmers being well educated and wealthy Britons.  Many had served in the English 
military and came to Kenya armed.  A fair comparison might be to the South African Boers 
which translates directly as farmers as to their willingness and ability to fight.   
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propaganda, the African demands for self-rule were met with incredulity and open scorn in the 
metropole.  However, some politicians drew the connection between the colonial farmers in 
Kenya and the bloody, costly conflict fought by the Boers. Furthermore, the British government 
was keeping close watch on the economically and politically disastrous rebellions in colonial 
French Algeria. 
 The Mau Mau defined success as survival against the vast martial resources of the British 
Empire and, by that definition, they were successful.  Guerilla action had greatly subsided by 
1955 and Britain recalled a significant portion of troops, artillery and armored cars against the 
advice of Lt. General Lathbury—who recommended the British army remain in Kenya—under 
the authority of the War office, as colonial forces had proven ineffective at coping with the 
insurrection. 39    Lathbury, many of the colonists, and some key figures in government now 
operated under fearful speculation that a resurgence in violence was inevitable as a result of the 
military withdrawal.  Parliament now feared any public disturbance or demonstration in Kenya to 
be a product of the Mau Mau.  This put enormous pressure on Kenyan Colonial Governor Sir 
Evelyn Baring (1952-59) to maintain the appearance of peaceful coexistence.  Where previously 
civil disobedience had been swiftly and brutally quelled by the British army, the colonial 
governor now gave in to minor demands from the native public rather than risk reigniting the 
guerrilla warfare.  Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1954-59, was 
concerned the growing civil discontent was “strikingly reminiscent” to the atmosphere in Kenya 
directly before the “Mau Mau rebellion.”  This marked the first time a public official recognized 
the violence as a rebellion rather than terrorist activity.  The climate of anxiety was fueled by 
                                                 
39 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 54. 
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fears of further violence in Kenya, but policy makers were also beginning to fear a socio-political 
nightmare should hostilities resume. 40 
 The source of this anxiety was due, in part, to a secret labor camp created to house the 
most radicalized of the Mau Mau; the colonial government determined these prisoners high risk 
as they would not recant the Mau Mau oath.  The Hola detention camp was one of hundreds built 
during the insurgency but was known to the Kenyan population for its daily use of torture, 
castration, starvation, and other abuses as punishments.  On March 3, 1959, the Home Office’s 
fears were realized as colonial police massacred eleven inmates at Hola.  In an act of defiance, 
eighty-eight detainees dropped to the ground and refused to work on the basis they were political 
prisoners and not subject to work detail. 41    Guards threw the prisoners into a ditch and beat the 
defenseless men until the soldiers “were too tired to continue.” 42   Time Magazine reported the 
massacre as described by doctors from the Red cross who were on humanitarian duties in the 
camp. 43 International opinion condemned the murders while the British public demanded an 
immediate investigation.  For its part, the British government distanced itself from colonial 
affairs and left the colonial governor to handle the crisis.  The colonial Governor in Britain 
renamed the camp Galole while Kenyan Colonial Governor Baring destroyed any documents that 
may have embarrassed himself or the British government.  When asked why he destroyed such 
                                                 
40 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 293. 
 
41 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Documents Relating to the Deaths of Eleven Mau Mau 
Detainees at Hola Camp in Kenya. 
 
42 Ibid. 
 
43 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 344. 
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crucial evidence, he indicated he simply had no room for storage. 44  With the investigation thus 
stymied, no prosecution was possible although the camp was eventually shut down in the wake 
of harsh public and international criticism. 
 In an effort to re-establish a relative peace in the colony, the British farmers agreed to 
allow Kenyans their own colonial representation.  However, the British government—
embarrassed by Hola and concerned with maintaining the appearance of imperial strength and 
stability—refused their notions of “settler diplomacy.” The British colonial government, in their 
effort to diffuse the negative publicity, would regard every Kenyan lobby, boycott or 
demonstration, every organization or parade as a potential for Mau Mau activity.  Kenyan 
nationalism was on the rise and the Colonial forces regarded all Kenyans as Mau Mau whereas 
before they distinguished between insurgent and civilian.  It was at this point of heightened 
anxiety that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63) stated he was reluctant to continue 
colonial rule of Kenya “because of the Mau Mau and all that.” 45  Since 1956 and the end of the 
guerilla war, little organized violence was seen from the Mau Mau and yet four years later, the 
threat of a resurgence dictated political discussion in parliament.46  Lennox-Boyd argued for a 
multicultural Kenya, governed by the British colonial office, while other members of parliament 
desired more military reprisals, even though the realistic consideration of Kenyan violence was 
negligible.  After the horror of Hola camp, however, the “radicalized” Mau Mau had moved from 
violent opposition to a more political agenda.  They rejected a multicultural Kenya and 
demanded self-rule.  The extreme methods Britain used to defeat the Mau Mau galvanized the 
                                                 
44 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 372.  
 
45 This reference is from Macmillan’s personal diary as read 19 Dec. 1961. 
 
46 Fazan, Colonial Kenya Observed, 249. 
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Kenyans into a politically savvy, nationalistic, unified political entity.  The shared cultural 
experiences from the Great War and decades of foreign occupation instilled a desire for self-
reliance, civil liberties and political autonomy.  The success of the revolutions and the outrage at 
Hola camp gave them strength and purpose. 
 In an astounding, almost willful, lack of comprehension of the political fervor in the 
colony, Hola camp Commandant G.M. Sullivan adopted the “Cowan Plan.”47  Still fearing an 
international political disaster, the colonial government sent more Kikuyu to prison camps, 
forcing Gavaghan, now the Camp Superintendent, to find new methods of controlling the 
growing numbers of prisoners.  The plan, defined as “rehabilitation through work,” was 
implemented by working prisoners so hard they were too tired to resist.  Cowen instructed 
Sullivan to work the inmates with little food or rest and if they resisted “They would be 
manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task.” 48 The Chief of the Colonial 
Police, Colonel Arthur Young, who had fought during the revolution, found conditions so 
repugnant he repeatedly and formally made complaints to Governor Baring concerning the 
“revolting crimes” against the prisoner populations. 49  What Young could not have known was 
that Gavaghan had received explicit approval from Lennox-Boyd to treat the prisoners “the 
                                                 
47 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 346. 
 
48 Ibid. 
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rough way.” 50  Baring, who expressed his concerns, was also assured by Lennox-Boyd that 
“London stands by Gavaghan and his methods.” 51   
 As the Office for Colonial Affairs still refused to acknowledge the political motivations 
of the Kenyans, they were unwilling to negotiate or compromise with the native peoples.  The 
Kenyan people were aware the camps were employing brutal tactics in their efforts to 
“rehabilitate,” including genital mutilation and rape. 52  Ironically, the British colonial authorities 
were further radicalizing Kenyans with oppressive policies meant to subdue them.  More 
Kenyans were taking the Mau Mau pledge now than during the rebellion, and yet Gavaghan 
continued the brutality within the camps with the full consent of London.  There is no direct 
evidence that Britain even considered Kenyan independence at this time. Shifting global power 
and the fear of bad press on the international scene pushed the British to accept this process as 
inevitable. 
 
Global Geopolitics 
By the end of 1959, the importance of Kenya had grown beyond agriculture and 
exploitation, becoming Britain’s last stronghold in Africa which now boasted a strategic military 
base.  The international community had begun expressing anti-colonial sentiment that spiked 
anxiety in Britain as another outbreak of violence in Kenya would bring severe political pressure.  
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Britain stated it would continue the “peaceful” development of Kenya while fearing the United 
States-led United Nations could cost them their hold in Africa. 53   McMillan had intelligence 
reports from the Colonial Office as early as 1957 that warned British absence from East Africa 
would result in “greater Soviet intrusion in the area.”54 Any further military action against the 
Mau Mau could cost Britain their friendly standing with the West.  Even a relatively minor 
incident could convince Western powers that Britain was continuing to promote white 
supremacy in underdeveloped nations.  The United States, whose “opinion was always critical,” 
was especially concerned with the political situation in Kenya as the possibility of Mau Mau 
looking to the Soviet Union for support was very real. 55  International concerns and pressure 
from the U.N. compounded anxieties that further rebellion would cost the British prestige, votes 
and colonial resources. 
 These anxieties were realized in 1961 as American President John F. Kennedy addressed 
the United Nations.  Kennedy expressed sympathy for the Kenyan peoples and their desire for 
self-rule.  British officials were more certain than ever that Mau Mau activity would bring U.S. 
pressure against their rapidly dwindling imperial possessions. 56   The British Empire had already 
suffered an embarrassing political defeat in 1956 to the United States.  Britain and France had 
invaded Egypt with the intent of controlling the Suez Canal but were forced to withdraw due to 
U.S. and Soviet pressure.  Britain was forced to recognize their influence was waning and 
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became desperate to keep both colonial power as well as international influence. Decolonization 
became a central issue to Parliament in response to unfounded feelings of anxiety that a Mau 
Mau resurgence would create a negative effect on their special overseas relationships as “post 
war debt forced Britain to play second fiddle to the anti-imperial United States in the cold 
war.”57 The reality was that the Mau Mau, as a militant organization, had been silent for half a 
decade.  
 The United States was promoting its own agenda to create a unified African bloc capable 
of withstanding communist ideology. 58  France and Germany, who were economically 
surpassing the struggling United Kingdom, were also developing their relationship with the 
United States, this put further pressure on Britain to improve their own relationship with the 
American government.  Britain sought to maintain the global appearance of a liberal democratic 
and modern power while continuing to promote pro-white policy in the colonies.  The fear of 
their imperial legacies overshadowing the multi-cultural persona they maintained and weakening 
their status with the U.S. brought de-colonization one step closer to realization.  Pressured by 
Labour Party rhetoric of “one man, one vote” democracy, Lord Home of the Commonwealth 
Relations Office argued Britain must grant independence to Kenya by 1969. 59 More 
conservative recommendations suggested a twenty-year withdrawal.  The decision was no longer 
whether or not to de-colonize Kenya, but rather when decolonization would occur. 
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 Prime Minister Macmillan considered protecting the special relationship with the U.S. 
during the Cold War era as far more practical than retaining a questionably profitable Kenyan 
colony. 60  His policies reflect an interest in international stability and political modernization that 
also reflects his doubts about maintaining any imperial possessions.  Upon his election, 
Macmillan represented the third consecutive, conservative P.M. and would be succeeded by a 
fourth.  Exempting the post war years of Clement Attlee (1945-51), Britain had maintained 
conservative leadership for thirty years. Macmillan faced fierce opposition from the Kenyan 
settlers who had assumed the role of elite “aristocrats” in their rule of Kenya. 61  He had no 
doubts about the catastrophic economic sanctions the U.S. could bring to bear nor the power of 
his own constituency when roused, as he had seen both in action after the humiliating resolution 
of the 1956 Suez Crisis. 62  Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd both concluded that any colonial 
instability would severely jeopardize their political standing, internationally as well as at home, 
and could negatively impact the economic and political power of Britain on a global scale. 
 With the specter of the Hola massacre still in the public mind, African leaders began a 
campaign across European universities inspiring students and members of academia to condemn 
British foreign rule. 63  Firsthand accounts of the horrors of Hola camp created new interest in 
investigating the potential government cover up.  Newly radicalized Britons cast severe doubts 
on the multiracial ideology the British government portrayed.   The very repression used to 
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maintain the fiction of a peaceful Kenya was a driving force behind the abrupt change in public 
opinion about maintaining the Kenyan colony. 
 There can be no doubt that British law makers chafed against American intrusion as “the 
United States never took a kindly view to Britain’s possession of a colonial empire” and, as such, 
“were not averse to interfering in Kenya.”64  Further, although the American government 
propagandized their support of colonial subjects, they financially supported freed colonies to 
“induce loyalty against communist intrusion.”65  Historian Max Beloff, who discusses the 
“catastrophe of decolonization,” wonders how the global community supported American 
pressures against colonialism while the U.S. was, itself, a colonial empire which subscribed to 
the “Monroe Doctrine”, had a lengthy and bloody history in the Caribbean, and were arguably 
the “dominant, albeit informal, imperial power.”66   
 In February of 1960, Macmillan gave his famous “Wind of Change” electoral speech in 
which he argued for radical change in Kenya and hinted that democracy might be an option. 67  
Macmillan feared that an overly quick withdrawal would spur settlers to violent action to 
maintain their colonial status while too slow an evacuation might convince the Mau Mau to 
resurface in violent rebellion. 68  Whether due to it being an election year or true sympathy for 
Kenya, Macmillan had replaced Lennox-Boyd with the anti-colonial Iain Macleod (1959-61).  
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Macleod immediately initiated a moderately paced four-year withdrawal from Kenya.  Macleod 
thought this timetable quick enough to pacify the Mau Mau, yet slow enough to allow the 
European settlers to sell their properties and conclude any business in Africa. 69 Being a relative 
newcomer to colonial politics, Macleod recognized that unfounded anxieties about the Mau Mau 
had dictated Kenyan policy for too long.  Although, he understood the socio-political 
ramifications of an aggressive resurgence, no militant action nor sign of remilitarization had been 
seen in years; thus, Macleod approached the Kenyan withdrawal from a humanitarian 
perspective rather than a militant one. 70 To Parliament, Macleod’s apparent lack of political 
concern combined with his inexperience greatly heightened their anxiety of political 
repercussion and he was replaced in late 1961.  What Macleod failed to grasp was that 
Parliament feared any social development that was not controlled by Western powers and that 
mirrored Western structure would be perceived by the U.S. as Marxist Leninist strategies.71  He 
was replaced by Reginald Maulding who, perhaps seeing political opportunity, convinced 
parliament that a slower withdrawal would be tolerated by the international community. 
Furthermore, his racially-driven speech fed into parliamentary fears of a Mau Mau revitalization 
and exploited the idea that continued tribalism made the Kenyans incapable of self-rule; the most 
he would concede was a coalition government. 72  Once more, British legislation was being 
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dictated by fear of further insurgent activities whose possibility existed only in government 
propaganda. 
 Frustrated by broken promises, and perhaps sensing the dissension in Parliament, the 
Kenyan people staged several large nationalistic demonstrations.  In 1962, Parliament wrote the 
London Agreement in which Kenya gained parliamentary representation and, as a result, Jomo 
Kenyatta was reinstated as leader of the Kanu-Kadu government, serving as Kenya’s first 
president from 1962-78.  Kenya officially joined the Commonwealth–a British-led 
intergovernmental organization of free states–in 1963, with Kenyatta serving as the first Prime 
Minister. As the London Agreement was not universally accepted, the Kenyans bought out the 
lands owned by the white settlers to protect themselves from further violence. 73 In 1964, Kenya 
became a free Republic. 
 
Conclusion 
The power of the Mau Mau was not in their military might but the legacy of fear they 
instilled in both the colonial government and that of the metropole.  The struggles and 
deprivations visited upon the Kenyans at the hand of British farmers and soldiers swayed a 
public subject to decades of government and social propaganda that painted the Kenyans as 
vicious savages.  After the events at Hola, both colonial and British governors recognized the 
socio-political implications that full public knowledge of the camp conditions might cause.  The 
constant state of political anxiety convinced the British Prime Minister that the benefit to cost 
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ratio of keeping the Kenyan colony was not worth the risk of jeopardizing the U.K.’s “special 
relationship” with the United States. 74  The Mau Mau were not successful against the British 
military in a classic sense. Rather, the nationalistic sensibilities learned under the heavy hand of 
British oppression united the myriad tribes of Kenya into a powerful, unified, political 
movement.  The trend toward nationalism was distinct from the military aim of the freedom 
fighters, and yet to the British Parliament, they were synonymous.  The unified Kenyans were a 
threat to the stability of the colony as well as to the socioeconomic stability and prestige of the 
British in the global community.  Though the fear was misplaced, and Kenyan involvement 
misunderstood, the anxiety surrounding the Mau Mau shaped British policy that would 
contribute to the end of British colonial power in Africa by 1980.  
 
Epilogue 
 Class and ethnic struggles marked post-colonial Kenya as nationalism gave way to 
tribalism in the abrupt shift into self-rule. Kenyatta remained President of Kenya and maintained 
relative stability in the nation until his death in 1978. The power vacuum led to violence as 
factions vied for power. The Garissa and Wagalla Massacres of 1980 and 1984 were both ethnic 
in origin, while the attempted coup by the Kenyan Air Force in 1982 was a desperate plea for 
international assistance that set the Kenyan army against friends and family who served in the air 
force.75  In 2001, Kenyan politics stabilized under a coalition government between two of the 
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largest parties. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was led by Kwai Kubaki until 2013, 
when Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta took office; he still serves as President.  
 Today, the specter of colonial abuses continues to haunt the British government. In 2009, 
based on the research of Caroline Elkins and others, five Kenyan survivors of Hola detention 
camp sued the British government for restitution for colonial abuses.76 The subsequent court 
proceedings were a litany of abuses by colonial authorities. Prosecutors presented evidence of 
sodomy, rape, castration and murder.  Telegrams between Lennox-Boyd and the colonial 
government detailed the burning of inmates alive as well as castrations, the breaking of bones 
and other abuses.77  The claimants in this case all suffered severe physical trauma.  Although, the 
current administration rejects liability for the crimes of the colonial government, enough 
evidence of parliamentary knowledge and complicity in the events led to the settlement of a 
shared twenty million pounds to over five thousand Kenyans. 78 
In 2011, Caroline Elkins tracked down thousands of documents in the British National 
archives that the colonial government of Kenya had attempted to destroy, unaware duplicates 
were being preserved by other departments. 79 These documents corroborate many of the claims 
made by Hola prisoners.  The telegrams, court records and correspondences sparked a second 
class action lawsuit for Kenyans who survived the British occupation, suffering emotional but 
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not physical abuse. 80  Certain communiques prove, incontrovertibly, that in 1961, Macleod, in 
order to distance the government from colonial abuses, initiated Operation Legacy, which 
ordered colonial representatives to destroy over eight thousand documents concerning any 
evidence of wrongdoing or racial prejudice. 81 These documents proved vital in confirming the 
complicity of the British government in colonial atrocities. The politically embarrassing episode 
will haunt the British administration for the foreseeable future. The lawsuit is expected to last 
until 2017. 
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